Abstract
The origins of the EU Battlegroups
In recent decades the European Union played a signifi cant role in the economic area on the international stage. In those days, tasks in security and defence matters were put in the hands of other organizationsthe Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. As a global player that encompasses about 450 million people and produces a quarter of the world's GNP, the EU needs to have instruments at its disposal to promote its interests and protect its citizens in the best possible manner. In addition, Washington has long called upon Europe to take greater responsibility for crisis management around the world, particularly if the EU wishes to become a major partner on the global stage. So, during the 1990s the need for an equal role for the EU in the political and security area evolved and with the Maasticht Treaty, 1 as an expression of the EU's readiness and willingness to play a signifi cant role in security matters on the international scene, a Common Foreign and Security Policy was introduced.
At the same time, in June 1992 the WEU Council of Ministers adopted the so-called Petersberg Tasks introducing the possibility of using the military forces of the WEU states in cases other than those of NATO Article 5
and Article V of the modifi ed Brussels Treaty (common defence), i.e. in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 2 The dissolution of the WEU led to incorporation of the "Petersberg Tasks" into the EU legal framework (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 ) and a few years later to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy thus giving the EU its own military and civilian operational capabilities. The fi rst step in developing the military capabilities was the adoption of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) in December 1999 and the declaration of the need for an EU rapid response capability in order to respond to the crisis in a timely and better manner.
The main goal of the HHG was to enable the EU by 2003 to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days in the crisis area in order to execute an operation within the Petersberg Tasks and to remain sustainable in the area of operation for one year. This force is often called the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).
Although the HHG was primarily designed for EU member states, it enabled contributions from non-EU countries too. Based on the HHG, the European over 100,000 soldiers, over 400 combat aircraft and about 100 ships, which was more than was needed by the HHG. These commitments were set out in a document called the "Force Catalogue". However, there were also failed areas such as strategic airlifts, tactical transport, sustainability and logistics, force survivability and infrastructure as well as command, control, The EUBG structure, purpose and main characteristics
The EUBGs are a specifi c form of rapid reaction forces, or rather a force package which has to be "(minimum) militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable" and "capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations". 15 This force package is composed of "combined arms battalion sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements" and it "must be associated with a Force Headquarters ((F) HQ) and pre-identifi ed operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics" 16 ( Figure 1 ). The EUBGs could be formed by a single EU member state or by a group of member states with a so-called "framework nation"
and its generic composition is about 1,500 troops. But the structure of EUBGs is not fi xed; it depends on the specifi c requirements of the operation and the member states are those that decide on how to constitute their BG package. Such fl exibility facilitates the EUBG Force Generation and enables a broader spectrum of capabilities. Therefore, the generic structure could be reinforced by different enablers such as maritime, air, logistic or others, so the EUBGs could reach a total of 2,500 troops or even more. For example, the Nordic Battlegroup that was on standby from 1 January until Regarding the time frame, the EU should be able to adopt the decision on launching the EUBG-size operation within fi ve days after the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council and EUBG troops are supposed to be deployed in the area of operations in the period of 10 days thereafter and stay in the area of operations for 30 days with the possibility of extending its deployment to 120 days, depending on the resupplying capacities. Speaking in geographic terms, the EUBG is supposed to be deployed in the crisis area up to 6,000 km away from Brussels. In addition, an EUBG is dedicated to a new crisis which demands readiness for deployment at very short notice (up to 10 days) in order to avoid the escalation and/or to set the conditions for robust troops in the case of timely and troop-demanding operations. So, an EUBG is not meant to be used for current operations or for solving old crises such as the Afghanistan one. In the process of building the EU rapid response capacity, the year 2005 was the targeted year for setting up the fi rst EUBG,
i.e. reaching the initial operational capability (IOC), i.e. a minimum of one BG was constantly on standby for six months, and the year 2007 was set as the year for reaching the EUBGs' full operational capability (FOC), meaning that the EU is able to undertake two simultaneous rapid response operations.
Missions, Tasks and Preparations
The exact aims and tasks of the EUBGs are not defi ned in any document.
They are based on the missions and tasks set up for EU military operations in general. At the beginning, the defi nition of EUBGs' missions and tasks were based on the so-called Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue 
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In this context we should mention that each engagement of the EU military forces, whether rapid response or not, asks for UN legitimacy of the operation. 25 In addition to that, there are two main conditions that have to be met to enable EUBG deployment: a new crisis and the need for rapid reaction. In the case of the latter, the EUBG could be employed as a stand-alone force in a short-term operation, or as an advanced force in a long-term operation facilitating the conditions for deployment of the robust troops. The duration of the EUBG engagement could be considered as a third condition, since the maximum foreseeable use of an EUBG is up to 120 days.
23 The Lisbon Treaty in Article 42 point 1 says: "The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States."
24 Article 43 point 1 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates: "The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories."
In 5. Assistance to humanitarian operations where the EUBG could help in delivering humanitarian aid or in protecting aid workers in the fi eld.
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If we analyse these fi ve scenarios we can see that the EUBG matches the latter two perfectly, although none of the others can be excluded.
Based on the above-mentioned scenarios, G. Lindstrom (2007: 18-19) pointed out three main situations for EUBG employment:
-Bridging operations in which the EU would support the troops already on the ground, to reinforce them or to take operational responsibility for a specifi c geographic sector to enable the existing troops to regroup; However, the costs covered through ATHENA rise up to 10% of the total costs for certain operations. For fi nancing EUBG engagement the same rules would be applied. when the Union budget cannot be charged. 35 In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty wording was, unfortunately, quite unclear, especially about its added value in reference to the ATHENA mechanism and so far nothing has been undertaken.
Apart from other stakeholders, even the European Parliament is encouraging the changes in the current way of fi nancing EU military operations with a view to improving the principle of fair burden-sharing. In this way, the European Parliament has recently supported the adjustment of ATHENA to "increase the proportion of common costs" 36 and called for "a signifi cant expansion of the common costs for rapid reaction operations, up to a full coverage of costs when battle-groups are used". 37 Also, the EP assumes "that any costs that are not linked to military operations, such as preparation and stand-by costs of battle-groups, could be charged to the EU budget".
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EU decision-making process
Having no army, the EU relies on the member states' contributions which means that the whole decision-making process is more complicated, especially from the perspective that the matters concerned are subject to the provisions of intergovernmental cooperation and thus consensus.
The situation with the EUBGs is even more complex due to the need for rapid response to the potentially escalating crisis. So, the reaction period is pretty tight and lots of work is needed. On the one hand, the EU has to decide on launching the operation and the manner in which to react, while on the other hand member states have to decide on a national level whether to participate or not. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) consists of the member states' ambassadors, meets at least twice a week and is responsible for managing crisis situations and day-to-day decision-making on CFSP and ESDP. 40 When a certain crisis draws the attention of the PSC and it concludes that EU action is needed, the next step is drawing up a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) that contains the political interests of the EU, the aims and objectives of the operation, politico-strategic options for responding to the respective crisis and a possible exit strategy. Furthermore, the UN mandate is a sensitive issue for the European Union.
So far all EU operations have been under the UN mandate. It depends on EU members whether it will be valid for the future too or whether there could be a situation when the EU would react without UN mandate. The latter possibility would defi nitely have a positive impact on rapid reaction possibilities while reducing the time for reaction, but whether it would be acceptable for EU members is hard to say. In any case, it has to be taken into consideration sooner or later. 
Concluding remarks
For decades the EU cherished the discrepancy between its economic signifi cance within the international community and almost insignifi cant role in the political, and above all, security and defence area while relying on NATO. At the end of the 1990s came the time for the development of its own security assets in order to protect its interests and citizens. The any value or has it already failed? The outcomes of the EUBG concept could be evaluated twofold -to a certain extent the EUBG initiative was successful while on the other hand it was a failure.
The economic crisis has put each country's budget under great pressure.
The most common way to address this problem is by decreasing the public budget, especially its defence part. That leads to cutting down investments in research, development and procurement in the defence sector. In contrast to cutting down the budget, participation in the EUBG concept asks for the dedication of a huge amount of money for building and preparing the EUBGs and even more money for their eventual deployment. In addition, the overall contribution of the countries whose EUBGs are not on standby at the time of operation is doubtful, bearing in mind the functioning mode of the ATHENA mechanism as well as the fi nancial modus operandi as a whole. Therefore, the burden and sharing principle is defi nitely undermined in the case of EUBG employment, unless the EU fi nds out a way to fi nance its military operations in the manner of a civilian one. It could be argued that security costs a lot but at least the expenditures could and should be divided fairly.
In addition, all participating countries suffer a certain shortfall regarding the means of deployment, i.e. strategic air and sealift. Acquiring such capabilities requires a lot of money and there is also the problem of their usability. Namely, transport by sealift is time-consuming while using faster airlift capacities is restricted by the limited landing possibilities in Africa, the most probable area of deployment, and fi nally both kinds of strategic transport are further affected by bad road conditions and the length of transportation from entry ports (air or sea) to the area of operation. And
EUBGs are supposed to enter the area of operation within 10 days of the EU decision. Also, the fact that all countries have the same set of forces at their disposal for EU, NATO and UN activities has to be taken into account.
Time pressure is also one of the obstacles in the EUBG story since it put at odds the need for rapid reaction and EU/national bureaucracy. Besides that, the decision-making process for EUBG deployment includes the consensus of all member states.
The fact that none of the EUBGs was deployed despite its engagement being considered a few times additionally complicates the positive judgement of their value. Their credibility in undertaking CSDP rapid actions has not been proven yet and "waiting for the ideal crisis may turn the Battlegroup into a 'forgotten' instrument of the CSDP toolkit" (Hatzigeorgopoulos, 2012: 6) . 43 On the other hand, neither have the forces declared through capability catalogues been used. When it comes to EUled operations, the ad hoc force generation processes still prevail.
However, EUBGs have signifi cantly intensifi ed and deepened cooperation among not only EU member states but among candidate countries and The opinions expressed in this article are authors own and not those of the MOD.
